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Entries for category:   Kentucky Class Action Law

 
Jan 09, 2012

Kentucky District Court's denial of class certification in mortgage lending case provides numerous lessons for class action defendants
 

In late December, On The Radar launched the "Sixth Circuit Dukes v. Wal-Mart Scoreboard" to examine the impact of the Wal-Mart decision on class certification decisions within the Sixth Circuit.  In our first post, here, we explained that perhaps the most important contribution of the Wal-Mart decision is that it models the "rigorous analysis" required under Rule 23, and provides the analytical metrics to distinguish between mere common questions, and common questions that will yield common answers--which is the sine qua non of commonality. 
 
The recent decision in In re Countrywide Financial Mortgage Lending Practices Litigation, 2011 WL 4862174 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011) is another example of a district court applying the lessons of Wal-Mart to deny class certification.  In In re Countrywide, the district court denied certification of a class of African American and Hispanic consumers because "the idea that thousands of loan officers in hundreds of separate locations around the country would exercise their discretion in a similar discriminatory manner defies belief." 
 
In re Countrywide provides a number of important lessons for those defending class actions.  To read the full article, click here.

 
Posted by D. Campbell in  Federal Class Action Law  Kentucky Class Action Law  Mortgage Lending Industry   |   Permalink

 

Jan 05, 2012

Fail-safe definition dooms state wage and hour class
 

Fail-safe class definitions are a hot topic.  Once treated as little more than a formality, there is increasing judicial awareness that a flawed class definition may reveal flaws in the class itself.  Given the enormous costs of class certification—to courts, plaintiffs, and defendants alike—there is good reason to scrutinize class definitions early in the process.  Like any good carpenter, when it comes to the class definition, a good judge will measure twice, and cut once.

The Sixth Circuit recently recognized these concerns.  In Randleman v. Fidelity Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussed in detail here) the court affirmed decertification of class alleging entitlement to a discount on a title insurance policy where a borrower refinanced the same property with the same lender within 10 years.  A class of those “entitled to relief” was deemed fail-safe because “[e]ither the class members win or, by virtue of losing, they are not in the class and, therefore, not bound by the judgment.”  Id. at 352.  The court stated that the fail-safe class definition was an “independent ground for denying class certification.”  Id.

Most recently, in Jones-Turner v. Yellow Enters. Systems, LLC, 2011 WL 4861882 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011), a Kentucky District Court Judge decertified a conditionally certified class asserting state wage and hour claims.   This is the latest case within the Sixth Circuit to strike a fail-safe class definition, and the first to do so relying on Randleman.   The case is important because it reflects a judicial willingness to revisit crucial threshold issues even after a preliminary decision on class certification, and without the necessity of an appeal to the Sixth Circuit.  Perhaps more important, it suggests that the Randleman decision is empowering district judges to root out fail-safe class definitions.  

The lessons learned from Jones-Turner are of critical importance for those defending motions seeking class certification.  While the Jones-Turner decision turned primarily on the lack of commonality, i.e., too many individualized claims, the fail-safe definition was an independent basis for decertifying the class. 

In fact, fail-safe definitions often occupy the other side of the commonality coin.  Classes that assert highly individualized claims—especially those that seek individual money damages—frequently implicate fail-safe issues precisely because the heightened precision required to establish the common issues often answers the ultimate questions, too.  Judge Simpson’s recognition of this phenomenon suggests a multi-prong attack on Rule 23(b)(3) class definitions.

To read the full article and learn more about the Jones-Turner decision and the lessons learned from it for those defending against class certification motions, click here.  


 
Posted by D. Campbell in  Class Definitions  Federal Class Action Law  Kentucky Class Action Law   |   Permalink

 

Oct 28, 2011

Rule 23(f) appeal filed in hog odor nuisance case
 

On October 26, 2011, Defendants-Appellants filed a Rule 23(f) Petition seeking immediate leave to appeal the District Court's October 13, 2011 Order granting in part Plaintiff-Appellee's motion for class certification.  The question presented in the Rule 23(f) Petition was this:  "Whether the Court should allow Petitioners Permission to Appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f) where the District Court: (1) failed to conduct any type of rigorous analysis required under Rule 23; (2) certified claims that Plaintiffs did not seek to certify; (3) certified claims against Defendants against whom Plaintiffs did not seek to certify claims; and (4) failed to address the expert opinions of Defendants' expert witnesses."  

Further, the "important and unsettled" questions highlighted by Defendants-Appellants are these: "(1) whether a district court can certify claims against defendants that the plaintiffs have not pleaded class claims against; and (2) the nature and extent of a court's duty to examine expert opinions in making a class certification decision."  

On the first unsettled question, Appellants point out the fact that Plaintiffs did not seek to certify claims for temporary nuisance, products liability, civil conspiracy, and punitive damages, but that the District Court certified these claims anyway. 

On the second unsettled question, Appellants note that the District Court accepted Plaintiffs' expert opinions as true, and ignored the criticisms and competing opinions presented by Defendants' expert.  Appellants advocate the Sixth Circuit's adoption of the standard set forth in In re: Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., which requires that an "expert opinion with respect to class certification, like any matter relevant to a Rule 23 requirement, calls for a rigorous analysis" and "should not be uncritically accepted." 522 F.3d 305, 323 (3d Cir. 2008).

You can find a copy of the Rule 23(f) appeal here.


 
Posted by B. Purdue Riddell in  Civil Rule 23 Requirements  Expert Testimony  Federal Class Action Law  Kentucky Class Action Law  Sixth Circuit Class Action Law   |   Permalink

 

Oct 14, 2011

Class action certified on Kentucky gross revenue tax
 

Adding to the list of post-Wal-Mart class action decisions, the Western District of Kentucky has certified a class of Windstream customers in Kentucky who were charged flow-through taxes and surcharges by Windstream.  Bowers v. Windstream Kentucky East LLC, W.D. Ky., No. 3:09-cv-00440-JGH (Oct 11, 2011).

Windstream provides telephone, cable, and internet services to customers all across Kentucky.  In Bowers, Plaintiffs alleged violations of state and federal telecommunications laws arising from Defendants' flow-through to customers of the “Kentucky Gross Revenue Tax” (“GRT”) in the form of the “Kentucky Gross Receipts Surcharge” (“GRS”).  The GRT is a tax imposed on telecommunications carriers and Defendants sought to recover their payments of the tax through the GRS.
The Court sustained Plaintiffs' motion for class certification pursuant to Rules 23(b)(3) (the damages class), but denied the motion as to Rule 23(b)(2) certification (the injunction/declaratory judgment class).

Despite a passing reference to the Supreme Court’s commonality finding in Wal-Mart, the Court held that “[a]lthough customers subscribe to varying services offered by Defendants, and the resolution of these issues may thus reveal a disparity in class members' entitled relief, common issues will nonetheless resolve and advance the entire class litigation.” Id.  

Likewise, regarding typicality, Defendants argued that that typicality was absent because Plaintiffs could not prove the claims of other Windstream customers by virtue of proving their own.  But the Court again refused to accept Defendants’ argument, finding that “adjudication of Plaintiffs' legal theories will resolve other Class members' issues.”  Id.

The Court then proceeded with certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  Although the Court noted that predominance is “far more demanding” than the commonality requirement, it found that “differences within a class are not necessarily fatal.”  Id. Even if there was “a need for individualized damages determinations” certification, the Court noted that bifurcation of liability and damages was an available option.  Id.

However, the Court was receptive to Defendants’ arguments on the issue of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.   Because Plaintiffs sought only damages as relief, and because a separate hearing regarding damages would likely be necessary, Rule 23(b)(2) certification was denied. 

You can find the full decision here.


 
Posted by B. Purdue Riddell in  Kentucky Class Action Law   |   Permalink

 

 

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